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Meyer v. State, 119 Nev. Adv. Rep. 61, 80 P.3d 447 (2003)1
EVIDENCE–JUROR MISCONDUCT-NEW TRIAL
“The right to trial by jury, if it is to mean anything, must mean the right to a fair
and impartial jury. A litigant is therefore entitled to a jury composed of 12
impartial jurors; …a party has the right to have that decision, whether for or
against him, based on the honest deliberations of 12 such individuals.”2
The legitimacy of our justice system hinges on the fact that the results of trials, as
dictated by a jury of one’s peers, remain free from the taint of extrinsic evidence and are
grounded solely on the evidence presented by the parties at trial. However, when jurors
bring with them to the jury box professional expertise or other experiences, such may
enhance the deliberations and ensure that the parties are afforded a better verdict
determined by a more educated jury. This is true as long as those experiences and
expertise were properly exposed during voir dire.
In Meyer v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court clarified the standard of review for
cases of alleged jury tampering or juror misconduct.3 The following Nevada Law
Commentary will discuss the facts and disposition of the Meyer case. Next, it will
discretely outline the standard pronounced by Meyer regarding obtaining a new trial
based on allegations of juror misconduct stemming from improper extrinsic evidence and
improper use of a juror’s own expertise and experiences. Finally, the corollary of when
jurors conceal material information during voir dire will be discussed.
In many respects, Meyer is a sound and laudable ruling that will serve to clarify
what the law is, while enhancing the jury deliberation process, a pillar of the legitimacy
of our civil and criminal adversary system of justice relies on. Yet, the potential for
jurors to conceal, during the voir dire stage, their experiences despite being asked about
them may serve to weaken Meyer’s foundation. As such, the Nevada Supreme Court
would be wise to one day clarify the new trial standard based on such concealment.
1. Meyer’s Facts, Disposition, and Analysis
Meyer was convicted of sexually assaulting his estranged wife Catrina.4 The
events leading to the conviction included a meeting between Meyer and Catrina at a bar,
where Catrina intended to have Meyer served with a temporary protective order (TPO).5
Intoxicated, Catrina left with Meyer.6 Officers were eventually dispatched to Catrina’s
residence, having been contacted by Catrina’s current boyfriend who had reported to
police receipt of a phone call where Meyer, “hostile and threatening,” had described to
1

By Timothy W. Roehrs, Nevada Law Journal Senior Staff member and third year student at the William
S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
2
McNally v. Walkowski, 462 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Nev. 1969).
3
Meyer v. State, 80 P.3d 447, 451 (Nev. 2003).
4
Id. at 453.
5
Id. at 451.
6
Id.

1

him a violent assault he was then committing against Catrina.7 When police arrived at
Catrina’s residence, they found Catrina wrapped in a blanket in her bedroom.8 Catrina
“had blood on her hands, various scratches and bruises over her body, as well as
significant injuries to her mouth and lips” and a series of raised bumps all over her scalp.9
Catrina alleged that Meyer had forced her to leave with him.10
Meyer was arrested nine weeks later and charged with kidnapping and “anal
sexual assault.”11 Catrina later recanted accusations previously waged, indicating that
“she remembered consenting to vaginal sex, and that she could have consented to anal
sex.”12 Later, at trial, she testified that she asked Meyer to take her home because she
was drunk.13 She said that she did not remember any details, other than throwing up,
including whether she and Meyer had sex or how she received her numerous injuries.14
Further, she suggested that “her injuries were the result of falling down and that she
bruised easily because she was taking the prescription medicine Accutane.”15 She also
admitted to previously engaging in “rough sex” with Meyer.16 Both sides presented
competing expert witness testimony with regard to the source of Catrina’s injuries
(including the bumps on her head) and the effects which Accutane may have had.17
7
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testimony from Dr. Ellen Clark, who indicated that Catrina's injuries were consistent with being
punched and kicked and were not consistent with falling down due to intoxication. Dr. Clark also
indicated that the injuries were not the result of Accutane side effects. On cross-examination, Dr.
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Meyer testified and indicated that he went to Sneakers at Catrina's request. She was intoxicated
and left with him voluntarily. He admitted that he gave the police false information because he
feared that he might be taken to jail. Meyer indicated that falling down and bumping into various
items that night caused Catrina's injuries. He admitted to having vaginal intercourse with Catrina
and digitally penetrating her anus, however, he stated both acts were consensual. Meyer also
disputed Hunt's version of the phone call. Finally, Meyer testified that he was not fleeing the
country when he was but was on vacation for seven weeks with his girlfriend, although he
admitted that he knew at least two days after the incident that the police were looking for him.
Meyer presented testimony from three experts. Dr. Donald Henrikson indicated that Catrina's
injuries were consistent with falling down or bumping into items. He indicated the anal injuries
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Meyer was acquitted of first-degree kidnapping, but was found guilty of sexual
assault. After speaking with jurors, Meyer subsequently filed a motion for a new trial
based upon alleged jury misconduct and the trial court denied the motion.19 The Nevada
Supreme Court overturned the trial court’s new trial denial.20
18

Meyer’s motion for a new trial was grounded, principally, in two arguments.
First, with regard to the “bruises, marks, or bumps” on Catrina’s scalp, affidavits
established that one juror, who was a Washoe Medical Center nurse, had opined that the
bumps were similar to those she had observed in domestic violence hair pulling
situations.21 Second, another juror, had consulted a “Physicians’ Desk Reference” (PDR)
on the side effects of Accutane and had advised the jury that “[a]ccutane only causes easy
bruising in one percent of the population.”22
The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s conclusion that the juror’s
statements about the connection between hair-pullling and the scalp injuries in question
did not constitute misconduct because that juror “used her everyday experience as a
nurse, not extrinsic information.23 Following the New Mexico Supreme Court in Mann,
the court held that “a juror who has specialized knowledge or expertise may convey their
opinion based upon such knowledge to fellow jurors. The opinion, even if based upon
information not admitted into evidence, is not extrinsic evidence and does not constitute
juror misconduct.”24 The court highlighted that voir dire is an opportunity for attorneys
to question jurors about their expertise and subject them to preemptory or for cause
challenges.25 Indeed, jurors failing to disclose information during voir dire commit
misconduct, which may serve as grounds for a new trial.26

were minor and that the small bumps on Catrina's head could be acne, though they were more
likely to have been caused by ‘minor blunt force injury.’ Dr. Thomas Turner testified about
alcoholism and alcoholic blackouts. He opined that Catrina suffered such a blackout on the night
in question and that her statements were probably the result of conversations with others rather
than a true memory of what happened. Finally, Diane Faugno, a registered nurse and sexual
assault examiner, testified that Catrina's injuries were inconsistent with being hit and kicked in the
head, though the lip injuries were consistent with being hit. Faugno had no opinion regarding the
source of the small bumps on Catrina’s head. Faugno indicated she saw nothing in the evidence
she reviewed that suggested a violent, nonconsensual sexual assault, but she admitted she could
not rule out sexual assault. Meyer's expert witnesses did not attribute Catrina's bruises to the side
effects of Accutane.)
The State and Meyer produced additional witnesses who presented conflicting evidence about
Catrina's appearance, statements, or attitude before and after the incident. Finally, the State
introduced evidence of a prior domestic violence incident involving Meyer.”).
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On the issue of the extrinsic PDR research, the Nevada Supreme Court held that
the actions constituted juror misconduct that amounted to prejudice and ordered a new
trial on that basis.27 It found that the PDR information on Accutane was material to the
case and “tended to undermine Meyer’s theory that the victim’s physical marks were
caused by a reaction to medication or falling.”28 As such, the court held that “the
average, hypothetical juror could have been affected by this extraneous information, and
there is a reasonable probability that the PDR information affected the verdict.”29
2. Meyer’s Rule Regarding Obtaining a New Trial Based on Juror Misconduct
in Nevada
In addition to the aforementioned disposition, Meyer gave an insightful step by
step standard for when jury misconduct can lead to a new trial. A description of this
standard follows.
The denial of a motion for a new trial will be upheld absent an abuse of
discretion by the trial court.30 A district court’s findings of fact cannot be disturbed
absent clear error.31 Yet, de novo review of a trial court’s conclusions regarding the
prejudicial effect of any misconduct will apply to allegations that the jury was exposed to
extrinsic evidence in violation of the Confrontation Clause.32
a. Proving misconduct
Generally, at common law, jurors may not impeach their own verdict.33 The
exception to this rule is where extrinsic information or contact with the jury occurs.34 In
such instances, “juror affidavits or testimony establishing the fact the jury received the
information or was contacted are permitted.”35 “An extraneous influence includes,
among other things, publicity or media reports received and discussed among jurors
during deliberations, consideration by jurors of extrinsic evidence, and third-party
communications with sitting jurors.”36 By contrast, intrinsic or intra-jury influences (i.e.
improper discussions among jurors, harassment, and intimidation) are generally not
admissible to impeach a jury verdict.37 To prove misconduct, one must show “readily
ascertainable” objective facts and not delve into a juror’s thought process or state of
mind.38
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b. Burden of Proof
To prevail on a new trial motion, the defendant must present admissible evidence
that establishes: (1) that juror misconduct occurred, and; (2) the misconduct was
prejudicial.39 If there is a reasonable probability or likelihood that misconduct affected a
verdict then that misconduct is prejudicial.40
i. Determing whether Misconduct is prejudicial
Prejudice sufficient to warrant a new trial will be presumed where an extraneous
influence is excessively egregious, such as in cases of jury tampering.41 Extrinsic
influences are by their nature more likely to be prejudicial, and establish a reasonable
probability that extrinsic contact affected the verdict. Examples include direct third-party
communications with a sitting juror relating to “an element of the crime charged” or
exposure to significant extraneous information concerning the crime charged or
concerning the defendant.42 To the contrary, extrinsic material like media reports will not
raise a presumption of prejudice.43 In cases involving the latter, “extrinsic information
must be analyzed in the context of the trial as a whole” to determine if by a reasonable
probability the verdict was affected.44
ii. Evaluating Misconduct
To determine whether there is a reasonable probability that juror misconduct
affected a verdict, instructive, but not dispositive factors deserving consideration include:
“…how the material was introduced to the jury (third-party contact, media source,
independent research, etc.), the length of time it was discussed by the jury, and the
timing of its introduction (beginning, shortly before verdict, after verdict, etc.).
…whether the information was ambiguous, vague, or specific in content; whether
it was cumulative of other evidence adduced at trial; whether it involved a
material or collateral issue; or whether it involved inadmissible evidence
(background of the parties, insurance, prior bad acts, etc.).
[and]…the extrinsic influence in light of the trial as a whole and the weight of the
evidence.”45
Thereafter, “whether the average, hypothetical juror would be influenced by the juror
misconduct” must be determined.46
39
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c. Alleged misconduct – motion for new trial.
Meyer provided key boundaries on what might constitute misconduct:
“In reaching their verdict, jurors are confined to the facts and evidence regularly
elicited in the course of the trial proceedings. A juror is prohibited from declaring
to his fellow jurors any fact relating to the case as of his own knowledge.
However, jurors may rely on their common sense and experience. If a juror has
personal knowledge of the parties or of the issues involved in the trial that might
affect the verdict, the communication of that knowledge to other jurors is
considered extrinsic evidence and a form of misconduct. Likewise, if a juror
considers and communicates a past personal experience that introduces totally
new information about a fact not found in the record or the evidence, this would
constitute extrinsic evidence and improper conduct. Personal experiences are to
be used only to interpret the exhibits and testimony, not as independent
evidence.”47
i. Analysis of the evidence by a juror with professional expertise
It is possible that a juror’s experiences make their statements in jury deliberations
more akin to a form of expert opinion.48 In considering the question of whether quasiexpert opinion statements by jurors constitute misconduct, courts around the country are
split.49 Following the direction articulated by the New Mexico Supreme Court, Meyer
announced the following rules:
“A juror who has specialized knowledge or expertise may convey their opinion
based upon such knowledge to fellow jurors. The opinion, even if based upon
information not admitted into evidence, is not extrinsic evidence and does not
constitute juror misconduct. However, a juror is still prohibited from relating
specific information from an outside source, such as quoting from a treatise,
textbook, research results, etc.”50
“Jurors are prohibited from conducting an independent investigation and
informing other jurors of the results of that investigation.”51
In supporting this rule, responsibility has been placed squarely on the shoulders of:
attorneys, jurors’ honesty, and the integrity of the voir dire proceeding:
“During voir dire, prospective jurors may be questioned regarding any
knowledge or expertise they may have on an issue to be tried and, based upon
their responses, may be the subject of peremptory or for cause challenges. Jurors
46
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who fail to disclose information or give false information during voir dire
commit juror misconduct, which, if discovered after the verdict, may be grounds
for a new trial under the standards established for juror misconduct during voir
dire as opposed to misconduct that occurs during deliberations.”52
3. Meyer’s Implications
Courts are in disagreement with regard to the question of whether quasi-expert
opinion statements by jurors constitute misconduct. New Mexico, which Meyer
followed, has held that “jurors can rely on their professional experience and educational
experiences when deliberating” and such communication does not constitute extrinsic
evidence.53 In New York, where a nurse expressed her expertise as to a material issue of
the case, a new trial was ordered.54 In recognizing that jurors could use expertise to
arrive at their own decision regarding credibility or the verdict itself, New York
suggested that “trial courts modify their standard preliminary instructions so that jurors
are advised that they could not use their professional expertise to supplement the record
on material issues.”55 In a “middle of the road” approach, California allows jurors,
regardless of their education or employment background to express technical opinions so
long as that opinion is based on the evidence at trial.56
In choosing the New Mexico approach, Meyer cited New Mexico’s contention
that it might be difficult to “distinguish between a juror’s opinions and experiences as
improper extraneous information and permissible deliberation based on life
experiences.”57 Moreover, if an attorney feels that a juror’s education or professional
background may cause them to be biased that juror can be removed during voir dire and a
failure of jurors to reveal important information about their expertise may be grounds for
a new trial.58
a. A Problem: Juror nondisclosure during voir dire
Meyer did fail to contemplate one important consideration: the extent to which
jurors will not be upfront during voir dire.59 And further, when is a juror’s concealment
actually intentional?
Jurors’ failing to disclose material information during voir dire is neither a recent
development, nor is it an unusual one.60 Accounts of information withheld include:
52
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failing to reveal having been a victim of a spousal abuse or even failing to reveal having
met the defendant.61 Jurors fail to respond honestly during voir dire, among other
reasons, because of: nerves, a desire to serve that outweighs the desire to tell the truth, or
because voir dire questions are “too trivial to merit an honest response.”62 Some may
even hope to use their jury experience as anecdotal fodder for future conversations with
friends.63 “Most research indicates that approximately twenty-five percent of jurors fail
to reveal material information during voir dire.”64
So when can a party get a new trial based on a juror concealing material
information during voir dire? Nevada’s standard holds that “a juror's intentional
concealment of a material fact relating to his qualification to be a fair and impartial juror
in the case may require the granting of a new trial.”65 “Where it is claimed that a juror
has answered falsely on voir dire about a matter of potential bias or prejudice, in the final
analysis, the termination turns upon whether” the juror committed intentional
concealment, the determination of which, is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court.66
“The states vary, …in their approach to determine intentional concealment; some
use an objective test, while others use a subjective test. States using an objective
test will look to see whether a reasonable juror would have disclosed the
information during voir dire. States using a subjective test will look to see
whether the juror in question acted honestly and in good faith.”67
In Lopez, the Nevada Supreme Court refused to overturn the denial of a new trial
motion based on a two jurors’ failure to reveal that they had been the victim of child
abuse.68 There, both jurors, when questioned if they had been the victim of child abuse
answered no, but did so, apparently, because neither associated the child abuse they
endured to be a crime.69 The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that this
reasoning revealed no intentional concealment.70 Nevada jurisprudence since Lopez has
had varied results; in one instance upholding a new trial motion denial where a juror
again mistook the meaning of what a crime was and later overruling the trial court denial
of a new trial motion where a juror failed to reveal that his father had been murdered
when asked if he or a family member had ever been a victim of a crime.71
61
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A standard that too easily finds “intentional” concealment based on jury
nondisclosure may incentivize lawyers, post verdict, to “track down jurors and question
them about every aspect of the deliberations in hope of finding some ‘inadvertent’
error.”72 However, a standard that which makes getting a new trial based on jury
nondisclosure too difficult will undermine the Meyer ruling, and its dependence on jurors
giving honest answers during voir dire.
4. Conclusion
Nevada’s jury concealment new trial standard, which is subjective,73 may not be
tough enough and needs to be further defined. Possibly, the objective standard, which
will more easily bring about the new trial penalty based on an unreasonable juror voir
dire concealment that eventually taints a jury verdict, will better comport with Meyer’s
rather liberal allowance of a juror’s expertise and experiences in deliberations. But more
questions need to be answered:74 among others, when is a concealment material; what
responsibility does the lawyer have in asking the right questions such to tease out
information that might otherwise be concealed and even given concealment when does
such concealment actually lead to jury bias?
Fundamentally, Meyer is a sound piece of case law. But as is often the case, the
Nevada Supreme Court has left open for itself more work to do with regard to jury
misconduct / new trial legal doctrine.

indicated that he did not consider himself to be a victim of a crime, but instead considered the
incident a fight. …As Ivy's testimony indicates that he did not view the 24-year-old incident as a
criminal act, the district court was well within its discretion in determining that Ivy did not
intentionally conceal information from the court.”);
but see Canada v. State, 944 P.2d 781, 782-83 (Nev. 1997) (During voir dire and on the jury questionnaire,
juror, Gordon, “was asked whether he, a family member, or a close friend had ever been a victim of a
crime. He answered, ‘Thank God, No’ and ‘Never.’” Later, “he informed the other jurors, both during the
trial and penalty phases, that his own father had been murdered when he was an infant. …The trial court
concluded that there had been no juror misconduct because Juror Gordon had not intentionally concealed
any information during the jury selection process.” The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that “given the
numerous, major crimes of which Juror Gordon claimed that he and his family were victims, the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to find intentional concealment.”)
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